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Statewide Inclusionary Land Use Laws and
Suburban Exclusion
Spencer M. Cowan
There is little, if any. dispute over the need
for more low- or moderately-priced 1 housing, nor
is there much disagreement that the shortage of
such housing is more severe in newer suburbs
than in central cities and older, inner-ring
suburbs. One way of addressing those situations
is through inclusionary land use rules that make
the production of lower-priced housing an
integral part of residential and/or commercial
development. These rules are intended to
increase the supply of low-priced housing and
reduce its increasing concentration in existing
areas of poverty.
All inclusionary programs present a trade-off
for the de\ eloper. For projects subject to the
inclusionary rules, the developer bears the
burden of providing some affordable units
( inclusionary units) as a condition for receiving
development permits. In return, the developer
receives benefits to offset that burden. : These
benefits almost always will include a density
bonus; that is. the developer will be allowed to
build more units (bonus units) than would have
been allowed in the absence of the inclusionary
rules. The bonus units can then be sold or rented
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at market prices. In addition, the inclusionary
rules may allow or mandate other cost saving
incentives to help defray the additional expense
of providing the inclusionary units ( Smith et al.
1996; Mallach 1984). The intended result is an
increase in the supply of lower-priced housing, 3
financed mostly by the added profit generated by
the bonus units ( Dietderich 1 996). In theory, no
direct public funding is required. 4
Inclusionary rules may be adopted by an
individual municipality^ as local regulations
(locally-adopted).'1 or they may be enacted at the
state level
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as part of the general laws and state
regulations (statewide)/ Some statewide plans
specify the essential program elements (state-
designed). 1 ' while others require municipalities to
accommodate housing for lower-income families
but let local government determine the operating
details of the program to accomplish that goal
(locally-designed)."' Some municipalities in
states with statewide programs have also
adopted their own local plans with provisions
different from, but not inconsistent with, the
state's;" statewide and locally-adopted plans are
not mutually exclusive.
This article will discuss: 1 ) the beliefs
underlying statewide inclusionary programs, to
show which aspects of the problem of suburban
exclusion they are trying to address, and 2) the
characteristics of five existing statewide
programs, to highlight the similarities and
differences among them. While statewide, the
programs in California and New Jersey are
locally-designed and exhibit many of the same
operational elements as locally-adopted plans,
such as the one in Montgomery County.
Mary land. The programs in Connecticut.
Massachusetts and Rhode Island are all state-
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designed and offer a distinctly different
approach.
Suburban Exclusion and Statewide Plans
The essential difference between statewide
and locally-adopted inclusionary plans is in the
basic theory underlying the two classes of
programs. Locally-adopted programs are based
on the premise that the scarcity of affordable
housing in a community is due to the
unwillingness of developers to produce such
housing. Therefore, municipalities must compel
developers to build affordable units as a
condition of getting approvals for the larger
project. Statewide programs, on the other hand,
are based on the theory that the scarcity of
lower-priced housing is. at least partially, the
deliberate and/or inadvertent result of local land
use and development regulations. Lower-priced
housing is being excluded (Dietderich 1 996:
Davidoff et al. 1971 ). Therefore, the state must
either prevent municipalities from using their
power to exclude, or compel them to accept
some affordable housing through regional or
statewide allocation.
The connection between local land use
ordinances and exclusion is a widely-noted
phenomenon (Pendall 2000: Farley et al. 1993).
and the reasons offered to explain why that may
be so are also numerous. Rolleston (1987) finds
three reasons why municipalities adopt the kinds
of land use regulations that they do: fiscal
concerns, reduction of negative externalities and
discrimination. The first two are consistent with
arguments that suburban exclusion may be an
unintended side-effect of legitimate local actions
to address community concerns (Mueller 1 989;
Fischel 1985). All three are consistent with
explanations ofwhy local government might,
affirmatively, want to exclude the poor
(Dietderich 1996: Briffault 1990).
The fiscal concerns are based on the desire
of local officials to provide the highest possible
level of local services at the lowest cost to
residents. Since most municipal revenue is from
local property taxes, this objective may be
accomplished by permitting only those units that
will contribute more than their ratable share of
property taxes for the existing level of services
(Mueller 1989;Tiebout 1956). That means that
rationally, local government should only permit
relatively more expensiv e residential
development, excluding the poor who probably
will require more in locally-funded services than
they pay in property taxes.
Two commonly identified negative
externalities ofdevelopment that local regulations
seek to prevent are traffic congestion and
decreasing property values ofexisting housing
(Dietderich 1996; Rolleston 1987). Both are
associated, whetherjustifiably or not. with the
increased density and multi-family units that may
be necessary to produce lower-priced units
(Pozdena 19*87; Ellickson 1981). Local
government can. therefore, rationally conclude
that more widely scattered, single-family housing
will help avoid those negative externalities and
zone accordingly. 12 Because large-lot single-
family housing is relatively expensive to produce,
the poor are excluded.
A community that wants to exclude
minorities and the poor or that does not want
affordable housing built within itsjurisdiction can.
easily and with legally sufficient reasons, adopt
zoning and subdivision regulations that make the
development of affordable housing economically
impossible (Dietderich 1996; Davidoff etal.
1971: Babcock 1966). Although Buchanan v.
Warley 1 - prevents local government from
explicitly discriminating based on race, local
government is allowed to discriminate based on
wealth. 14 and. given the correlation between
wealth and race in this country, that achieves
substantially the same end result. Under the
guise of protecting the general welfare or
preserving property values. 1 - a municipality can
limit new housing to single-family units on large
lots. It can impose infrastructure requirements
that drive the cost of subdivision out of the range
of affordability. It can. through hurdles and
delays in the permitting process, make it clear to
prospective developers that they will not gain
approval, within time and cost parameters that
allow any chance of financial viability, for
projects seeking to create lower-priced housing
(Lugeret al. 1997; NIMBY Report 1991).
Because all of these local government actions
drive up the price of housing, they effectively
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keep out the poor and minorities, even if that is
not what was intended (Luger et al 1997; Lowry
etal. 1990; Johnston etal. 1984; Seidel 1978). If
it is what was intended, the law will still accept
the proffered reasons as sufficient to justify the
local actions.
Statewide inclusionary programs are a direct
response to perceived suburban exclusion
(108HLR1 127 1995;Breagy 1976). In these
programs, the state, as sovereign, steps in to limit
municipalities" power to exclude and/or compel
them to permit some affordable housing. There
are two ways that states have done this. In one
approach, used in New England, the state has
directly limited local power and imposed a
complete inclusionary system on its constituent
municipalities so that all operate under exactly
the same rules. The other approach, used in
California and New Jersey, compels
municipalities to accept a "fair share" of regional
affordable housing needs but gives local
governments flexibility in meeting that
responsibility. Municipalities are required to plan
for their regional allocation of affordable housing,
and the state provides for sanctions for failure to
comply."1 That strategy has led to a variety of
local tactics, including inclusionary programs.
Because each plan is locally-designed, there is
substantial variation in the operational details
among the various local programs, with many
quite similar to the Moderately Priced Dwelling
Unit ordinance in Montgomery County.
Maryland.
Whether the plan is state- or locally-
designed, review and approval of development
proposals remains at the local level. The rules
for the permitting process may be modified, but
local boards still have the responsibility for and
power over the initial project approvals ( Lohe
2000). The statewide program is not one in
which the state takes over local government's
role in deciding how development should occur.
Program Participation - Mandatory or
Voluntary
One of the most fundamental differences
between the two statewide systems is how any
given municipality's program determines whether
a specific development proposal will be governed
by the inclusionary rules. The rules may require
developer participation (mandatory program), or
developers may be allowed to choose whether to
have the inclusionary rules apply ( voluntary
program).
Most locally-designed plans, including
approximately 90% of plans in California, are
mandatory (Burchell et al. 1994). although there
are exceptions. 17 This may reflect local officials'
belief that developer choices are the reason for
the shortage of lower-priced housing in their
community. 18 The three statewide, state-
designed programs in New England are all
voluntary. Those programs operate on the
premise that local government exclusion is the
dominant reason for the scarcity of lower-priced
housing in the suburbs and that developers will
produce more of it if they are not hindered by
local government (Herr 2000; Stockman 1992).
The New Jersey program, as initially created
by the state's Supreme Court in Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
Laurel 1 " {Mount Laurel I) and Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt.
LaureP {Mount Laurel II), was a voluntary
plan. It originated with Mount Laurel /. where
the Court found that the local government was
excluding and ordered it to stop. Eight years
later, in Mount Laurel II, the Court found that
the same township was still "afflicted with a
blatantly exclusionary ordinance."' 21 At that
point, the Court created a "builder's remedy""
that allowed developers to seek permits in court
for inclusionary development. In response to
local governments" complaints about the impact
of the builder's remedy, the state legislature
created a statewide program, superceding the
Court's program, that has allowed municipalities
to adopt mandatory inclusionary regulations and
avoid the builder's remedy (Burchell et al. 1994;
Mandelker 1990)."
Mandatory programs typically require a
project to be inclusionary if it is over a threshold
size. Commonly, that threshold is based upon the
number of units in the proposed development,
although that is not the only possibility. The
program may exempt some types of residential
developments, such as projects that create rental
units. Commercial development may also be
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subject to inclusionary requirements, with the
threshold based on the number of square feet,
prospective employees, or some other
quantifiable basis (Burchell etal. 1994;
Mandelker 1990: Mallach 1984; Ellickson
1981). 23
Voluntary programs induce participation by
offering sufficiently large incentives to make
development under the inclusionary rules more
attractive than under the regulations that would
otherwise apply to the project. Instead of
determining when a project must be inclusionary.
voluntary programs have criteria to establish
whether a project or developer may be eligible
for those benefits. The rules may require a
minimum percentage of affordable units as a
condition of participation, and they may restrict
eligibility by prohibiting for-profit developers, as
is done in Massachusetts24 and, under some
circumstances, in Rhode Island. ;s In addition,
the programs all are self-limiting to prevent
developers from overwhelming any single
municipality with affordable units or excessive
density. Projects are not eligible in any
municipality that meets statutory threshold
criteria, such as having 10 percent or more of its
housing stock subsidized.
Basic Program Elements
The basic elements of an inclusionary
program establish the quid pro quo of the trade.
They determine: 1 ) how many inclusionary units
the developer must produce; 2) how much of a
density bonus he or she will receive; and 3) other
cost-saving incentives that may be included in
the bargain as additional compensation for the
inclusionary units.
Set-aside Requirement
The first part of the trade the program must
specify is the percentage of inclusionary units, or
set-aside requirement. The California and New
Jersey programs use regional or state authorities
to determine regional housing needs and allocate
a "fair share" of those to each municipality,
which may then impose sufficient set-asides on
new development to attain that "fair share."
Because the program details are specified
locally, the set-aside requirements may vary from
one municipality to the next. In California, most
of the programs require a set-aside of between
1 and 1 5 percent of the total number of units in
the project, although the actual set-asides range
from 5 to 35 percent (Burchell et al. 1994).
The New England voluntary programs
establish the set-aside percentage as the
condition of eligibility for the density bonuses and
other incentives of the program. In
Massachusetts, for example, only projects
providing 25 to 30 percent affordable units may
proceed under the inclusionary rules, while
Connecticut requires 20 percent for some
classes of projects (Burchell et al. 1994;
Stockman 1992).
Density Bonus
Closely linked to the set-aside requirement is
the extent of allowable density bonus. The
higher the set-aside, the greater the density
bonus must be to compensate for the cost of the
inclusionary units, all other things being equal. 20
For mandatory programs, the additional units
must adequately compensate the developer for
the cost of producing the inclusionary units to
avoid two possible negative consequences. If
the bonus is not sufficient, the regulations could
be found to be a taking, or developers may
decide to build where their profits are not so
adversely affected (Dietderich 1996: Mandelker
1990; Ellickson 1981). The latter is less of a
factor if the inclusionary requirements are
regionally uniform because developers will find it
harder to move to avoid them and still serve the
same target housing market. 27 Most mandatory
programs establish the number of bonus units as
a function of the number of inclusionary units
required, allowing X bonus units for every
inclusionary unit (Dietderich 1996).
For voluntary programs, the density bonus
has to be enough to make inclusionary
development preferable to proceeding under the
otherwise applicable rules (Dietderich 1996:
Stockman 1992). The three statewide voluntary
programs in New England all allow the developer
to determine the extent of density bonus
necessary to make the project economically
viable, considering the set-aside required for
program participation.
24
Only in California do municipalities have the
option of not allowing a density bonus. One of
the California state laws mandating local
inclusionary plans requires communities to "grant
density or other bonuses" (Burchell et al. 1994:
1 59), while another speaks of "•regulatory
concessions and incentives'" (Burchell et al.
1994: 159). That statutory language would
appear to give communities the option of
requiring inclusionary units without permitting
bonus units, although other cost saving incentives
are then required.
Additional Cost Saving Incentives
Finally, the program may identify additional
or alternative cost saving incentives that may be
allowed for inclusionary developments.
Typically, those include reduced infrastructure,
expedited permitting, fee waivers, or other
exemptions from locally adopted regulatory
requirements, all ofwhich are potentially
available under all five statewide programs.
Because voluntary plans rely on incentives to
induce participation, they are generally more
flexible and offer the potential for a wider array
of incentives than mandatory plans.
In offering other cost-saving incentives,
statewide plans have substantially more flexibility
than locally-adopted programs. A locally-
adopted plan is limited by the extent of the local
government's power. It can only change local
rules. The state, however, in adopting a
statewide plan, can offer additional incentives in
the form of exemption from or specific benefits
in state laws or regulations.
Neither California nor New Jersey make
significant use of that possibility for the locally-
designed mandatory programs adopted by their
municipalities. The builder's remedy in New
Jersey appears to give substantial benefit to
developers, but only, in effect, in communities
that do not have COAH-certifled housing
elements. The California DHCD may withhold
discretionary funding from a municipality if its
housing element does not comply with state
requirements (Burchell etal. 1994: Mandelker
1990). That may not directly save costs for the
developer of an inclusionary project, but it may
provide him or her with additional leverage in
negotiating for local permits. :s
All three statewide voluntary programs make
more extensive use of the ability to provide
incentives through changes in state law. One
common strategy is to reduce the time, expense
and uncertainty in the permitting process, a major
concern for developers (Luger et al. 1997).
Both Massachusetts and Rhode Island offer
inclusionary proposals through a unitary
permitting process, eliminating the need for
multiple local approvals. In both states, the
application goes to the local zoning board, which,
by statute, may grant whatever special
exemptions or variances from pre-existing local
regulations may be necessary for the project to
proceed and issue the permit. :" This saves
developers the time and expense of appearing
before several different town boards and
reduces the opportunity for opponents to delay
the project with appeals of each separate
approval. In addition, Massachusetts specifies
an accelerated schedule for hearing and
rendering a decision on the initial application for
inclusionary proposals, further reducing the time
needed. If the board fails to act within the time
allowed, either to open the hearing or render a
final decision, the permit is automatically granted
(Stockman 1992)/"
Beyond the limited preemption of local
regulations through the broad powers granted to
the local zoning board in the unitary permitting
process, all three statewide voluntary plans
provide for a substantially more developer-
friendly appeals process. In Massachusetts and
Rhode Island, inclusionary developments may
take an expedited appeal of unfavorable local
decisions to a special administrative agency, the
Housing Appeals Commission (HAC) in
Massachusetts and the Housing Appeals Board
(HAB) in Rhode Island. In Connecticut, the
appeal goes to a specially designated court on an
expedited calendar. In all three New England
states, the municipality has the burden of proving
on appeal that its decision was justified. This is a
reversal of the ordinary situation, in which local
decisions are accorded a presumption of
validity,' 1 and the developer would have to prove
that there was not "rational or reasonable basis"
for the decision, that it was "clearly erroneous."
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or that it was "arbitrary and capricious."32
Municipalities are more limited in the reasons
they may use to sustain an unfavorable decision
on appeal than those that would generally apply
to local regulatory decisions. While the exact
statutory language varies among the three states,
the common element is that protecting the
"general welfare" is not sufficient. To sustain an
adverse local decision, in both Connecticut and
Massachusetts, the appellate board must find
that the public interests justifying the decision
outweigh the need for affordable housing. In
Rhode Island, the board must find that the
decision was "both "reasonable" and "consistent
with local needs" as expressed in the locality's
comprehensive plan and zoning requirements""
(Burchelletal. 1994: 146).
The impact of these changes is to increase
the developer's chances of getting local approval
or prevailing on appeal of an unfavorable local
decision. In Massachusetts, between 1969 and
1 986-7. there were 458 applications under the
state's inclusionary program. Of those. 238
were granted without conditions. 89 with
conditions and 1 3 1 denied at the local level. Of
the 220 applications not granted unconditional
approval. 200 appealed to the HAC. Of those.
20 dropped the appeal before the HAC could
render its decision, leaving 1 80 applications. The
HAC upheld the local denial in only 10 of those
cases. In 70 cases, the board reversed the local
decision, and in 1 00 the parties settled and the
permit was issued as agreed. Therefore, of the
original 458 applications to build affordable
housing. 408 received permits, and the
developers who pursued their appeals to a
decision by the HAC received a permit in 1 70 of
1 80 cases (Burchell et al. 1994; Stockman
1992). 33 In Connecticut, as of the end of 1998.
there had been 36 court cases filed involving 28
developments resolved on the merits of the case.
The applicant prevailed in 28 of those cases
involving 2 1 developments. In addition, courts
rejected 4 cases in which an abutter appealed a
local approval (Hollister 1999).
Finally, the Massachusetts and Rhode Island
laws provide for a "builder"s remedy.'" allowing
the appellate authority to actually issue the
permit. This saves the developer the time and
expense of going back in front of the same local
authorities who rendered the initially unfavorable
decision. It also deprives those authorities of the
opportunity to reopen negotiations after losing the
appeal.
Other Program Elements
Price-'Rent Ceiling
Programs, both mandatory and voluntary,
usually specify the target price or rent for the
inclusionary units. 34 All five programs set the
price level based on income. In California, the
state compels municipalities to plan, through the
required housing element, for the needs of
households from very-low- through moderate-
income. Locally-designed plans vary from
targeting very-low- and low-income households
only, all the way to including moderate-income
units. New Jersey allocates the ""fair share" of
the regional needs of very-low- and low-income
households to each municipality, though the local
inclusionary regulations adopted to satisfy that
allocated share may include higher incomes as
well (Wish et al. 1 997; Burchell et al. 1 994).
Connecticut only allows low-income housing to
qualify for its program, while Massachusetts and
Rhode Island include moderate-income
households in their programs (Stockman 1992).
Affordab ility Covenants
Neither of the statewide mandatory
programs sets a specific limit on the length of
time that the inclusionary units must remain
affordable. One complaint about the earliest
local programs in California was that the units
only had to remain affordable for one year, after
which they could be sold at fair market value
(Ellickson 1981). However, since the system
requires each municipality to provide its '"fair
share" of affordable housing, it is in the
municipality's interest to ensure that the units
contribute for as long as possible, with
restrictions lasting from five years to perpetuity
(Burchelletal. 1994).
Two of the statewide voluntary programs do
require that the inclusionary units remain
affordable for a minimum period of time, at least
in some cases. In Rhode Island, inclusionary
units in developments by for-profits must remain
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affordable for at least 30 years. There are no
time limits on units in projects by government
agencies or non-profit organizations.
Connecticut requires a minimum 20-year
restriction (Burchell et al. 1994). Massachusetts
imposes no time limit within its program but limits
participation to government agencies, non-profits
and limited dividend corporations, reducing the
probability that the developer will be unwilling to
negotiate substantial affordability protection as
part of the permit.
In addition to any internal requirements in
either kind of inclusionary program, there may be
additional or more stringent affordability
restrictions imposed by external funding sources.
For example, some inclusionary projects in
Massachusetts receive tax-exempt bond
financing through state programs to increase the
supply of rental housing. That program
requires that 40 percent of the units be
affordable by households with incomes less than
60 percent of median, or that 20 percent be
affordable by households with incomes less than
50 percent of median, and they must remain
affordable for a minimum of 1 5 years (Stockman
1992).
Clustering, Off-site. Out-of-town, and
Payments In Lieu
Inclusionary developments under four of the
statewide plans are not necessarily required to
integrate the inclusionary units into the larger
project. Developers may be allowed to cluster
those units in one area, creating a small section
of affordable units separated from the more
expensive market portion of the project. Both
California and New Jersey allow locally-
designed programs to condone this practice, and
neither Connecticut nor Rhode Island prohibit it.
Of the state-designed programs, only
Massachusetts has regulations against clustering,
specifically requiring that the inclusionary units
be spread ratably through the project.
Under both the California and New Jersey
laws, locally-designed plans may allow the
developer to provide the inclusionary units off-
site, giving credit for units in other developments.
Developers can create one project of exclusively
market housing and another, at a different
location, with the inclusionary units that would
have been required for the market project. All
three state-designed plans in New England
require that the inclusionary units be built within
the same development.
New Jersey goes so far as to permit
developers to provide up to halfof all required
inclusionary units in a different city or town
through regional contribution agreements. This
allows suburban developers to build inclusionary
units in older urban areas to satisfy part of the
suburban "fair share" requirement. Some critics
have noted that this policy may work against the
goal of increasing housing opportunities in the
suburbs for lower-income households (Payne
1996).
For locally-designed plans in California and
New Jersey, where participation is mandatory,
the program may allow some developers, usually
for smaller projects or those for which additional
density cannot adequately compensate, to make
a payment in lieu instead of actually producing
the inclusionary units. The money is placed in a
fund that is then used to finance affordable
housing.
Impact of Statewide Inclusionary Programs
One of the most obvious advantages of a
statewide inclusionary program is that it can
address the problem of exclusion. Reliance on
locally-adopted plans cannot. Whether locally-
or state-designed, the statewide approach
ensures that all municipalities have inclusionary
rules. This, in turn, raises the probability that
every community will eventually have some
affordable units. When Massachusetts adopted
its totally voluntary inclusionary program in 1969,
only 2 of its 35 1 cities and towns had 1 percent
or more affordable housing. As of May 2000.
that had increased to 23 communities (Lohe
2000). with an additional 14 municipalities having
8 percent or more affordable housing/* Over
2 1 .000 units were produced under the law as of
October 1 999 ( Krefetz 1999). In 1972. 171
Massachusetts municipalities had no subsidized
housing; by 1 997. that figure was reduced to 54.
with the vast majority of them located in the
economically moribund western part of the state
(DHCD 1972; DHCD 1997).
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A statewide, locally-designed type of
program, as used in California and New Jersey,
may be preferable to the New England model for
two reasons. First, the New England voluntary
programs do not plan for the allocation of the
low-priced housing. Developers decide where it
will be built, without necessarily considering
actual local or regional needs. Only on appeal
are those needs assessed, and that is against an
arbitrary statutory guideline of 10 percent of the
housing stock of the local community. The two
statewide, locally-designed programs allocate
affordable housing to communities based on a
"fair share" of regional needs. While some
places in New Jersey have questioned their
allocation, at least there is some attempt to relate
location and need. Second, voluntary plans do
not ensure that all communities will have
affordable housing. Developers choose, and
they may decline to pursue inclusionary projects
in extremely hostile locations for fear of reprisal
on other, non-inclusionary proposals the
developer may be planning. Because the
statewide, locally-designed plans rest on a
mandate for all communities to accomodate a
"fair share" allocation, every municipality will
have some affordable housing.
The state-designed voluntary approach,
however, also has advantages. Locally-designed
plans can be rendered ineffective if there is an
imbalance between burdens and incentives, and
they are initially dependent on the commitment of
local officials for implementation ( Herr 2000).
Voluntary plans, in which the developer
establishes what the balance is. will be as
effective as long as inclusionary development
can be more economically efficient than the
alternative (Dietderich 1996). Because
developers implement the program, voluntary
programs will require little bureaucracy and are
very inexpensive to administer. There is no need
for regional authorities to determine the "fair
share" allocation, project growth and housing
needs, and oversee local plans. There is no
requirement to monitor the behavior of local
government to ensure compliance. Instead,
these functions are left to the developers who
initiate inclusionary proposals. The only real
expense to the state is providing an appellate
body to hear developer complaints.
One area where these programs may fall
short of their goals is in actually making
affordable housing available to the households
and groups that were previously excluded. 37
Wish et al. ( 1 997) note that only 7 percent of
households occupying units created in response
to the Mount Laurel decisions had moved from
cities to the suburbs, and 66 percent of those
were white. The main beneficiaries ofNew
Jersey's efforts were elderly white women
(Wish et al. 1997). In Massachusetts, the law
was amended after the state noted that
communities were permitting disproportionately
high percentages of elderly housing and lower
percentages of proposals for family housing.
After the amendment, only half of a community's
obligation under the law could come from elderly
housing (Stockman 1992).
Conclusions
Statew ide inclusionary development
programs are essential tools in efforts to reduce
suburban exclusion. Without them, municipalities
that want to keep out the poor will continue to
find adequate, legally-defensible means to do so.
The poor will be left to find housing in the
interstitial non-exclusionary areas where they
already are forced to reside. The jobs-housing
mismatch will persist. Poverty will remain
concentrated: growth will not be smart.
Both types of statewide programs discussed
in this article offer promising models, and neither
is clearly preferable. Both have characteristics
that could be profitably incorporated into the
other. They demonstrate the program elements
that must be addressed in the design of any
inclusionary program, statew ide or locally-
adopted, and the range of possible choices for
each of those elements. Five states have shown
what can be done. After careful consideration
of the options, an effective program can be
created that will reduce exclusion, open up
housing options for the poor, and still protect the
interests of local communities.©
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294 NE2d 393 (1973) authority, which is why Montgomery County
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(1991) ordinance. In other states, like North Carolina.
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 ( 1 9 1 7
)
whether local government has that authority is
James v. ( altierra, 402 U.S. 137(1971) unclear.
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of States do not have unlimited power, particularly if
Mt. Laurel, 336 A2d 713 (N.J.) appeal dismiessed there is a "home rule" provision in the state
& cert, denied. 423 U.S. 808 ( 1 975) {Mount Laurel constitution. When Massachusetts first adopted
f) its inclusionary law. its right to do so was
Southern Burlington Count}- NAACP v. Township of challenged as an infringement of local
Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158. 456 A2d 390(1983) governments' rights under the Commonwealth's
(Mount Laurel IT) home rule amendment. The claim was rejected.
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Affairs, 363 Mass 339, 294 NE2d 393 ( 1 973).
Statewide programs, as used in this article, are
those adopted by state government with some
affirmative requirement for local action or
limitation on pre-existing local power. This
definition includes the laws in California,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, and Rhode Island. Not included as
"statewide" programs are those state laws
authorizing, but not requiring, local government
to adopt inclusionary regulations, as in
Maryland.
In Connecticut, Public Acts 89-3 1 1 , codified as
Connecticut General Statutes, §8-30g. In
Massachusetts, Chapter 774 of the Acts of 1969,
codified as Massachusetts General Laws,
Chapter 40B, §§ 20-23. In Rhode Island, Public
Laws of 1 99 1 , Chapter 1 54, § I . codified as Rhode
Island General Statutes 45-54- 1 etseq.
In California, there are several provisions of state
law that apply. In New Jersey, New Jersey
Statutes 52:27D-301 etseq.
For example, Nantucket, Massachusetts, has a
mandatory inclusionary requirement for all
commercial developments ofover 4,000 square
feet enclosed space.
In fact, the right to prohibit multi-family units
from being built in the same neighborhood as
single-family houses was fundamental to the
original sanctioning of zoning by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Village ofEuclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 ( 1926). Justice
Sutherland, in his majority opinion, wrote:
"With particular reference to apartment houses, it
is pointed out that the development of detached
house sections is greatly retarded by the coming
of apartment houses, which has sometimes
resulted in destroying the entire section for
private house purposes; that in such sections
very often the apartment house is a mere parasite,
constructed in order to take advantage of the
open spaces and attractive surroundings created
by the residential character of the district."
(Euclidv. Ambler. 272 U.S. 365, 394 ( 1 926)).
245U.S. 60(1917).
Local regulations can't exclude minorities, of
course, since the Supreme Court ruled that local
ordinances that exclude based on race were
unconstitutional in Buchanan v. Warley.
However, the Supreme Court has, through its
decisions, left any judicial remedy for
economically exclusionary zoning to the states.
InJamesv. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137(1971), the
Court refused to grant privileged status to the
poor as it had in poll tax and criminal laws cases,
and it found a law requiring a referendum for
approval of all affordable housing to be race-
neutral. In Worth v. Seldin. All U.S. 490 ( 1 975 ),
the Court denied relief sought by outsiders
(residents, developers and non-profits) seeking
to challenge exclusionary practices of another
jurisdiction on the basis that the plaintiffs failed
to show specific injury from the defendant town's
actions. Finally, in Ullage ofArlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corporation. 429 U.S. 252 ( 1 977), the Court ruled
that disproportionate impact is not sufficient to
invalidate zoning decisions; there must be
evidence of intentional discrimination to amount
to a violation of equal protection. These cases
left matters largely to the states unless there was
clear evidence of racially discriminatory motives.
At the state level, the law may be different, and
discrimination based on wealth may be
prohibited. Courts in some states have limited
the impact of exclusionary regulations by finding
state constitutional or statutory limitations that
impose obligations to consider regional housing
needs in local regulations and decision making.
See Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township ofKit. Laurel. 336 A.2d 7 1 3 (N.J.)
appeal dismissed & cert, denied. 423 U.S. 808
(1975) (Mount Laurel I) and Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township ofMl Laurel. 92
N.J. 1 58. 456 A.2d 390 (1983) {Mount Laurel II).
which established the rule in New Jersey. Beck v.
Town ofRaymond, 1 1 8 NH 793, 394 A2d 847
(1978), and Brittonv. Town ofChester. 134NH
434, 595 A2d 930 ( 1 99 1 ). did the same in New
Hampshire. Other decisions have looked to
regional considerations when examining zoning
in New York. Pennsylvania and California.
North Carolina allows cities to adopt zoning
regulations "[f]or the purpose of promoting
health, safety, morals or the general welfare of the
community," N.C.GL. §160A-38I. "The
regulations shall be made. ..with a view to
conserving the value of buildings..." N.C.G.L.
>;160A-383. Counties have the same authority
under § 1 53A-340 and § 1 53A-34 1
.
In California, the state Department of Housing
and Community Development reviews the local
housing elements and may withhold
discretionary funding from municipalities whose
housing elements do not comply with state
requirements. In New Jersey, communities whose
housing elements are not certified by the Council
on Affordable Housing (COAH), the
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administrative agency established as part of the
legislative reaction to the Mount Laurel
decisions, are exposed to potential builder's
remedy lawsuits in state court.
One voluntary plan is in Orange County.
California. Originally, the county had a
mandatory plan, but it changed. The county has
been one of the most successful in the state at
producing affordable units, with over 6,400 of the
statewide total of 20.000 units. Most of the
Orange County units were produced under the
mandatory program (Burchell et al. 1 994).
They may. very well, also recognize that their
own actions may have contributed to the
problem. There is no evidence to indicate that
the local preference for mandatory programs is an
attempt to deny any responsibility for the
shortage of affordable housing in the community.
It may be an honest effort to address the
possibility that both governmental and private
sector decisions have played a role in the
creation of exclusionary suburbs.
336 A.2d 7 1 3 (N.J. ) appeal dismissed & cert,
denied. 423 U.S. 808(1975).
92 N.J. 1 58. 456 A.2d 390 ( 1 983 ).
Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township ofMt. Laurel, 92t<U. 158. 198,(1983).
To avoid the builder's remedy, a community had
to adopt a housing element that presented a
reasonable prospect of meeting its "fair share"
obligation. That plan had to be certified by
COAH. Upon certification by COAH. the
community would receive a six year exemption
from builder's remedy lawsuits. Some New Jersey
municipalities have not sought certification, and
so the builder's remedy remains possible in those
jurisdictions.
California, with its variety of locally -designed
programs, offers examples of these criteria.
Under the Massachusetts law. only government
agencies, non-profits and limited dividend
corporations are eligible.
Under the Rhode Island law, for-profits may
qualify if the project is for rental housing and the
inclusionary units will remain affordable for at
least 30 years.
Other program requirements may affect the extent
of density bonus needed to compensate the
developer. For example, the lower the allowable
price of the inclusionary units, relative to their
cost of production, the greater the compensation
needed.
For example, with a strictly local plan, the
developer only has to move to the next town.
With a uniform statewide plan, he or she would
have to move to another state. In the latter
situation, the developer obviously would less
likely serve the same housing market as he or she
would in a move from one town to the next.
Wheeler ( 1 990) describes the local permitting
process as negotiation. The threat of the
possible loss of state funding could be one factor
a developer could use to convince the local
permit granting authority that the municipality
would be better off allowing the inclusionary
project than not.
For example, without the unitary permitting
process, a developer might have to submit one
application to rezone the property from single-
family to multi-family, increase allowable density,
reduce frontage and setback requirements, and
increase maximum floor area ratio to conform with
the proposal. He or she might need separate
approval to subdivide the parcel into multiple
building lots once it is rezoned. Then he or she
might need a certificate ofcompliance from the
local conservation commission, a certificate of
adequate public facilities from the traffic safety
committee, etc.
In practice, there are techniques local boards can
use to slow permitting, but the process is still
faster than having to obtain multiple permits
(Stockman. 1992).
A legal doctrine which allows courts to presume
that local actions are valid and requires a party
challenging to prove that they were not.
The "rational reasonable basis." "clearly
erroneous." and "arbitrary and capricious"
language is commonly used as the standard of
review in decisions on appeals of local
government actions. There are other bases upon
which a local decision could be overturned,
including lack of procedural due process. The
regulation upon which the decision is based may
have been beyond the authority of the
municipality to adopt. The standards cited are
those applicable to challenges to a procedurally
proper decision based upon a statutorily sound
local regulation.
It should be noted that 70 of the pro-developer
HAC decisions were without conditions. That
means that the permits were granted as originally
requested by the developer, without conditions
to which he or she might have agreed had the
local government negotiated a permit acceptable
to the developer.
One reason why I do not consider Oregon's
growth management svstem inclusionary is
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because it does not limit the price or rent of any
units.
The program is called the Tax Exempt Loans to
Encourage Rental Housing (TELLER). The
Commonwealth has other programs with other
requirements, both for rental and ownership
units.
That figure is based on my analysis of data from
Massachusetts DHCD, MHFA and other sources.
The goals for the Mount Laurel decisions and
subsequent legislation creating COAH were:
""To provide housing opportunities in the
suburbs for poor urban residents who had been
excluded by past suburban zoning practices.
To ameliorate racial and ethnic residential
segregation by enabling blacks and Latinos to
move from the heavily minority urban areas to
white suburbs" (Wishetal. 1997: 1276).
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